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Abstract
The number of rms and the wage inequality increased in U.S. manu-
facturing industries after the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the so-called
Carter/Reagan deregulationwas implemented. This paper provides a possi-
ble theoretical explanation for this observed relationship between the number
of rms and the wage inequality on the basis of xed cost. By modifying a
variety model, we show that lowering the xed cost of entry increases the va-
riety of inputs used by the nal good. The skill premium then rises through
variety-skill complementarity. Our model also shows that the size of a rm
decreases and the real wage of low-skilled labor does not necessarily decline,
which are compatible with U.S. observations.
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1 Introduction
One interesting fact in regards to the U.S. economy is that both the number of rms
and the skill premium showed a rising trend in U.S. manufacturing industries after
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Note that rm size was decreasing while the number
of rms was increasing and that the real wage of low-skilled workers did not show a
declining trend despite the increase in wage inequality.1
A second interesting fact is that the timing of events which can lower the xed
cost of entry (such as entry deregulation and technological change) is similar to the
timing of the increase in the number of rms and the skill premium. For example,
the so-called Carter/Reagan deregulationwas implemented in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. Data indicates that this entry deregulation has been prevailing in U.S.
product markets since the late 1970s: the index of entry costs in U.S. product markets
remarkably decreased from 5.2 to 0.6 during the period 1978-1997 (Ebell and Haefke,
2006).2
Due to these similarities, we should no longer ignore the possible relationship
between the xed cost, the number of rms, and the skill premium. This, however,
poses a theoretical challenge to us because no past research has related the number of
rms to the skill premium. Most of the past research has related technological change
(Katz and Autor, 1999; Berman et al., 1994; Krusell et al., 2000) or international trade
(Feenstra and Hanson, 1996; Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 1999; Acemoglu, 2003; Zhu
and Treer, 2005) to the skill premium. This paper, however, is the rst to link the
number of rms to the skill premium.3
We formulate a simple general equilibrium model to provide a possible theoretical
explanation for the observed relationship between the number of rms and the skill
premium on the basis of xed cost. By modifying a well-known variety model, we
1The number of rms which is dened by the number of establishments in U.S. manufacturing
industries increased from 358061 to 373548 over 1982-1997. The relative wage of high-skilled to
low-skilled workers which is dened by the relative wage of non-production to production workers
in U.S. manufacturing industries also increased from 1.58 to 1.88 over the same period. The size of
a rm which is dened by (total employment)/(the number of rms) decreased from 53.37 to 48.40;
the real wage of production workers in U.S. manufacturing industries which is deated by the CPI
slightly increased from 100 (1982=100) to 102.07 over the same period. The source of data is the
U.S. Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM). Note that the ASM uses census data for the number
of establishments, and this census is conducted at 5-year intervals.
2Ebell and Christian (2006) calculate the index of entry costs by adding the entry delay (as
a fraction of a year) and the fees (as a fraction of annual per capita GDP) and then converting
to months by multiplying by 12 to obtain a composite entry cost measure. Many papers provide
evidence on the costs of entry. For example, see Djankov et al. (2002).
3Many papers relate regulation/entry costs to labor market performance such as the size of
employment. For example, see Boeri et al. (2000) and Pissarides (2001).
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show that lowering the xed cost in the intermediate sector increases the variety of
inputs used by the nal good. The skill premium then rises if we assume variety-
skill complementarity. We also show that the size of a rm decreases and the real
wage of low skill does not necessarily decline, which are compatible with the U.S.
observations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate a two-
sector variety model with xed cost and show that our model can qualitatively explain
the observed facts if we assume variety-skill complementarity. We nally conclude
and mention future research in Section 3.
2 Model
2.1 The Ingredients of the Model
In this paper, we modify the standard one-sector variety model (Dixit and Stiglitz,
1977; Krugman, 1979; Dixit and Norman, 1980; Ethier, 1982) by extending the model
to a two-sector model.
Consider an economy with a nal good sector and an intermediate goods sector.
There are two types of skills: high-skilled and low-skilled labor. Their endowments
are given by H and L, respectively. These skills di¤er in that the high-skilled labor
can handle a variety of tasks but the low-skilled labor cannot.
The production side is as follows. The nal good sector is perfectly competitive
and non-traded. It uses a continuum [0; n] of intermediate goods and the high skill.
The technology is given by the following constant returns to scale production function:
y =
264
0@ nZ
0
x (j) dj
1A= +H
375
1=
;
where y is the output of nal good, x (j) and H are the demand for di¤erentiated
intermediate good j and high skill, and the total number of variety is n. We assume
that  < 1 and 0 <  < 1. The elasticity of substitution between the varieties and
high skill is given by  = 1= (1  ).
On the other hand, the di¤erentiated intermediate goods sector is monopolistically
competitive. Firms are symmetric and follow Cournot pricing rules. There is also
free entry and exit. Each variety uses the low skill, and the technology of each variety
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is given by the following increasing returns to scale production function:
x (j) =

1
b

max [l (j)  f; 0] ;8j;
where l (j) is the demand for low skill to produce each variety j, f is the xed cost
in terms of low skill, and b is the unit low-skill requirement.
The demand side is as follows. For simplicity, we focus on a representative con-
sumer who has the endowments of high skill and low skill: H and L. He or she
consumes the nal good. His or her utility function is given by:
u(c) = c;
where c is the quantity of the nal good he or she consumes. His or her budget
constraint is given by:
pyc = w
H H + wL L;
where py is the price of the nal good, wH is the wage for the high skill, and wL is
the wage for the low skill.
The feasibility conditions for high-skilled labor and low-skilled labor are:
H = H;
nZ
0
l (j) dj = L:
Finally, let us assume that a government can control xed cost for rms in the
intermediate goods sector. We note that a decrease in the xed cost may be caused
by technological progress as well as a policy such as entry deregulation.
2.2 Free Entry and the Skill Premium
First, we derive the free-entry number of rms n^ in the intermediate sector with the
regulated xed cost at f .4
Given an arbitrary n, each producer of varieties facing the indirect demand by
the nal good sector maximizes the prot p (j)x (j)   wLbx (j)   wL f where p (j)
4In regards to the free-entry number of rms, Mankiw and Whinston (1986) is one of the most
notable theoretical studies. They show that there is a tendency toward excess entry from a so-
cial standpoint in homogenous product markets and that product di¤erentiation can reverse this
tendency.
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is the price of intermediate good j. By setting wL = 1 as numeraire and using the
symmetry x (j) = x, the output x (n), price p (n), and prot  (n) of each variety
corresponding to this n can be given by:
x (n) =
"
b
pyn(=) 1
=(1 )
  n=
# 1=
H;8j;
p (n) = p =
b

;8j;
 (n) = (b=)x (n)  bx (n)  f; 8j:
Since the price does not depend on the number of varieties n, the price when the
prot of each variety becomes zero by the free entry and exit is also given by p = b=,
and the zero prot condition px (n^)  bx (n^)  f = 0 with p = b= gives the output of
each variety, x (n^) =
 
f

= [b (1  )]. The equality of labor demand and supply in
the intermediate sector, n^

bx (n^) + f

= L, gives the free-entry number of rms n^:
n^ =
L (1  )
f
:
As we can see, lowering the xed cost f is accompanied by an increase in the
equilibrium free-entry number of rms n^.
Second, we derive the solutions in the nal sector.
Let us solve the maximization problem for the nal good sector by means of the
following short-cut method. Dene a new good
X =
0@ nZ
0
x (j) dj
1A1=
and its price pX . The prot of the nal good sector now becomes:
py (X
 +H)1=   pXX   wHH:
By solving the cost minimization problem for the good X, we nd that the price
of X is:
pX =
0@ nZ
0
p (j)=( 1) dj
1A( 1)= :
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By symmetry p (j) = p, this pX becomes:
pX = n
( 1)=p:
The market clearing condition for the nal good and the rst order conditions
with respect to X and H then give:
wH = pX
 L
H
1 
;
where pX = n( 1)=p. Since we have normalized wL = 1, the relative wage of high-
skilled to low-skilled labor skill premium is simply given by wH .
Finally, by combining the solutions in the intermediate sector and in the nal
sector, we get the skill premium wH
 
f

corresponding to the regulated xed cost f :
wH
 
f

=
 
n^( 1)=p
 L
H
1 
; (1)
where n^ = L (1  ) = f:
2.3 The Control of Fixed Cost, the Number of Firms, and
the Skill Premium
We now see the possible relationship between the number of rms and the skill pre-
mium on the basis of xed cost. From (1) in Section 2-2, we get the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If the government decreases the xed cost f , then the skill premium wH
decreases if  > 0, remains unchanged if  = 0, and increases if  < 0.
Proof. Di¤erentiating (1) in Section 2-2 with respect to f gives:
dwH
 
f

d f
=
+ or 0 or  z}|{

+z }| { 
n^( 1)=p
 1 (  1)2

n^ 1=p
 L
H
1 
L f 2:
From the above lemma, we get the following proposition.
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Proposition 2 Suppose that the government decreases the xed cost. Then the num-
ber of rms increases. The skill premium, the real wages of high- and low-skilled
workers, and the size of a rm also change as follows.
e Skill Premium Hw Real Wage of H Real Wage of L Size of Firm
0>e - + + + -
0=e Unchanged + + -
0<e + + + + -
+ + - -
Note : +and -refer to an increase and a decrease, respectively. + +refers
to a greater increase than +.
Proof.
1. The signs of a change in wH are obvious by Lemma.
2. y and wH=py (=MPH) are positively correlated. The decrease in xed cost causes
y " and thus wH=py ".
3. wH # is caused by wH=py " and wL=py "".
4. wH " is caused by [wH=py "" and wL=py "] or [wH=py " and wL=py #].
5. The size of a rm in the intermediate sector, L=n^, decreases due to n^ ".
In this proposition, we have shown that lowering the xed cost f for rms in the
intermediate sector increases the variety of inputs n^ used by the nal good. Then the
skill premium wH rises if  < 0, that is, if the varieties and high skill are complements.5
We have also shown that the size of a rm decreases and the real wage of low skill
does not necessarily decline, which are compatible with U.S. observations. We note
that the decrease in the xed cost is here caused by the control of the government,
though it can also be caused by technological progress.
5Here we dene the case  < 0 ( < 1) as the case in which the varieties and the high skill are
complements. In some papers, the number of inputs plays a role in a related way. Blanchard and
Kremer (1997) dene the index of complexity which relates the increased number of inputs to more
complexity in production processes. Kremer (1993) shows that higher skill workers will use more
complex technologies that incorporate more tasks.
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3 Conclusion and Future Research
We have shown some interesting facts in regards to the number of rms, the skill
premium, and the xed cost in the U.S. after the late 1970s and early 1980s. Section
2 has shown that our simple model can qualitatively explain these U.S. observations if
we assume the variety-skill complementarity. This indicates that the number of rms
can be one possible source of the factors contributing to the increased skill premium
in the U.S. after the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Of course, there are several next logical steps for future research since this paper is
only the rst step to add an alternative theoretical explanation for the rising inequality
to the literature. First, it would be interesting to look at cross-country data on xed
cost such as entry cost, the number of rms, and the skill premium in order to nd a
more robust relationship across countries (Japan, EU, etc.).
Second, we can extend this closed economy model to a two-country model. We
can thus analyze the possible e¤ects of domestic entry policy on the skill premium in
a foreign country through variety trade.
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